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Abstract
Observers saw an event in which a computer-animated square moved up to and made contact with another, which after a short delay
moved oV, its motion appearing to be caused by launch by the Wrst square. Observers chose whether the second (launched) square was
faster in this causal event than when presented following a long delay (non-causal event). The speed of the second object in causal events
was overestimated for a wide range of speeds of the Wrst object (launcher), but accurately assessed in non-causal events. Experiments 2
and 3 showed that overestimation occurred also in other causal displays in which the trajectories were overlapping, successive, spatially
separated or inverted but did not occurred with consecutive speeds that did not produce causal percepts. We also found that if the Wrst
object in a causal event was faster, then Weber’s law holds and overestimation of the launched object speed was proportional to the speed
of the launcher. In contrast, if the second object was faster, overestimation was constant, i.e. independent of the launcher. We propose that
the particular speed integration of causal display results in overestimation and that the way overestimation depends on V1 phenomenally
aVects the attribution of the source of V2 motion: either in V1 (in launching) or in V2 (in triggering).
© 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Perceptual causality is a striking and commonplace illu-
sory phenomenon occurring when temporal contingency
continuously relates two independent objects that are spa-
tially contiguous. Michotte, in his book The perception of
causality (1946/1963), Wrst observed perceptual causality in
vision between two objects moving sequentially at speeds
V1 and V2.
If V1 > V2, the Wrst object appears to cause a launch of
the second, whose motion appears passive and mechanical
(Fig. 1a). However, if V1 < V2, the second object seems trig-
gered by the arrival of the Wrst, its motion seeming autono-
mous (Fig. 1b) though still caused by V1. In triggering, the
motion of the second object is generally described as active
and autonomous (see Michotte, VII, 4) (Fig. 2), though still
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doi:10.1016/j.visres.2006.08.005involving mechanical agency. In this sense it should be dis-
tinguished from other causality phenomena producing the
perception of animated motion, which involves biological
animacy. In both launching and triggering, observers spon-
taneously describe the movement of the two geometrical
objects to be related in terms of cause and eVect.
Michotte argued that the relationship of causality in the
launching event is directly perceived, without the mediation
of high-level processes. Also recently it has been argued
that the perception of causality conforms to a modular,
encapsulated process (Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000). This view
Wnds support in the demonstration of the independence of
causal perceptions from causal judgments (Schlottmann &
Shanks, 1992) as well as the Wnding that perceived causality
is present in infants (Cohen, Amsel, Redford, & Casasola,
1998; Leslie, 1982; Leslie & Keeble, 1987; Oakes, 1994;
Schlottmann & Surian, 1999; Schlottmann, Surian, & Hesk-
eth, 2000) and children (Schlottmann, Allen, Linderoth, &
Hesketh, 2002). However, several authors have cast light on
the role of high-level components in the phenomenon
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1996; Schlottmann, 2000; Weir, 1978; White, 1995). We
agree that these are crucial in understanding the phenome-
non, since they suggest that the visual system is capable of
extracting implicitly high-level percepts such as the causal
and social structure of the world from simple events, an
ability of indubitable ecological value (Costall, 1991). The
classical demonstration of Heider and Simmel (1944) is
striking in this respect. It showed that observers spontane-
ously describe spatio-temporal contingencies as social
behaviour: moving geometrical shapes are perceived as
being alive and even as having goals and intentional
purposes.
Overall, studies of causality phenomena support an
interpretation of perceived causality as lying at the intersec-
tion between perception and cognition (Scholl & Nakay-
ama, 2002; Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000), although the
underlying mechanism remains unknown. If, as Michotte
suggested, a low-level component exists, important ques-
tions can be considered: for example, do diVerences in per-
ceived causality relate to diVerences in low-level motion
judgments? In particular, do diVerences in mechanical
causality and triggering relate to perceptual diVerences in
perceived motion?
In addressing these questions, we focused on the rela-
tionship between causality and perceived speed. Indeed,
since two speeds are presented consecutively after a short
interval they could be perceptually integrated, so that the
judgment of one speed could be aVected by the other. If
they were integrated, the way could be diVerent for diVerent
causal events such as mechanical causality and triggering.
Many studies, mostly using global motion patterns, have
investigated the ways in which the motion system can inte-
grate motion signals. From this work, it has been shown that
integration of local velocities occurs by averaging across
local speeds (Curran & Braddick, 2000; Khuu & Badcock,2002; Watamaniuk & Duchon, 1992), by vector sum (Wilson,
Ferrera, & Yo, 1992), or by co-operativity of motion (van
Doorn & Koenderink, 1984; Snowden & Braddick, 1989).
Averaging of local speed signals occurs independently of
direction (Watamaniuk & Duchon, 1992) and results in a
global speed estimate, but occurs only within and not across
speed integration mechanisms (Khuu & Badcock, 2002).
Integration of local velocities may also occur by vector sum.
However, Curran and Braddick (2000) demonstrated that
perceived speed of global dot motion was consistent with
vector average and not vector sum, while Wilson et al. (1992)
demonstrated that vector sum is more likely to account for
global motion direction rather than speed integration.
Motion integration may also occur on the basis of co-oper-
ativity of motion signals, but this phenomenon aVects
motion direction not speed (Chang & Julesz, 1984; Snowden
& Braddick, 1989; Vreven & Verghese, 2002; Watamaniuk,
McKee, & Grzywacz, 1995).
If in a causal display V1 and V2 were integrated, diVer-
entiation between the two speeds may prove diYcult.
Against this hypothesis there are data in the literature
showing that the visual system can diVerentiate local veloc-
ity with very high precision, with many (Casco, Grieco,
Giora, & Martinelli, 2006), two (McKee, 1981) and one
speed (Watamaniuk & Duchon, 1992). However, other data
demonstrate a segregation diYculty, since the two opposite
perceptual eVects — integration and diVerentiation — often
account for the Wnal percept. For example in the motion
contrast or induced motion phenomenon, apparent velocity
of a target depends strongly on its velocity in relation to its
immediate surround (Loomis & Nakayama, 1973). Other
studies have shown that discriminating speed changes is
hard (Gottsdanker, 1956; McKee & Nakayama, 1984;
Snowden & Braddick, 1991; MateeV et al., 2000) and Weber
fraction is several times higher than speed discrimination
for spatially and temporally separated stimuli. TheseFig. 1. Schematic illustrations of launching and triggering stimuli conWgurations. The arrows length is proportional to the speed. S1 moves in a straight line
and stops when it reaches S2, which moves oV along the same trajectory. When the speed of S2 (V2) is faster than that of S1 (V1), S1 appears to cause or
“launch” the motion of S2 (a). If V2 is larger than V1, then S2 seems triggered by the arrival of S1 (b). The duration of the pause at the contact allows
(40 ms) or disrupts (1040 ms) any causal impression. Dynamic demonstrations are available online at http://vision.psy.unipd.it/.
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Braddick, 1991) suggest that this result reXected averaging
or integration of speeds. Verghese and McKee (2006) dem-
onstrated that the spatial layout is important in speed dis-
crimination. The neural bases of integration and
diVerentiation are well known. They could be mediated by
mechanisms of both early level (where lateral interactions
between neurons underlying local speed estimation may
occur) and intermediate level (V3, V5 or MT, V6 or MST)
(Adelson & Movshon, 1982; Simoncelli & Heeger, 1998;
Wilson et al., 1992; Yuille & Grzywacz, 1988).
Since causality phenomena occur with presentation of
consecutive objects moving along a single trajectory (Mich-
otte, 1946/1963) and depend on the relative speeds, one can
predict that, as a consequence of speed averaging or diVer-
entiation, causality displays can give rise to speed misper-
ception. Interestingly, while averaging of V1 and V2 has not
been tested with perceptual causality displays before, aver-
aging as a mechanism for integration of various causality
cues (temporal and spatial contiguity, speed ratio) is sug-
gested by the work of Schlottmann and Anderson (1993).
The kind of speed misperception that can be originated
by causality displays can be predicted on the basis of phe-
nomenal reports, commonly described as qualitative
changes of the kinematics of the second moving object due
to the Wrst. Michotte clearly described the causality phe-
nomenon as a causal relationship in one direction only:
that is, V1 causes V2. This lead us to ask, if misperception
occurred, whether the speed of the second object was
aVected by the Wrst. We predicted that diYculty in correct
judgment of V2 would be observed as a consequence of
integration between V1 and V2.
Our main goal in all experiments was to isolate a possi-
ble speed misperception, speciWc to causal displays. In par-
ticular, we asked whether, in these displays, V2 was
correctly perceived or else depended on V1. Furthermore,
since causality phenomena depend on the relative speed as
well as on other spatio-temporal parameters, we sought to
establish whether diVerent causality events were associated
with diVerences in the perception of V2. Finally, we sought,
in Experiment 1, a possible psychophysical law describing
perceived V2 in causal events.
In the current study, observers viewed the classical
Michotte conWguration (pair of squares): the Wrst square
moved until it made contact with the second. The second
then started to move along the same trajectory while the
Wrst remained still (see Fig. 1 caption). In this causal event,
the interval between the two movements was very short and
should produce impression of causality. Observers were
asked to compare the speed of the second square in this
event with the speed of a second square in a subsequently
shown event that involved long interval between the two
motions, which should not produce a causal impression.
Our novel Wnding was that speciWcally for the causality
displays, misperception of V2 resulted in an overestimation.
Overestimation was not found with displays that did not
produce causal impression. Moreover, overestimation wasqualitatively diVerent in mechanical causality, where it was
proportional to V1, and in triggering, where it was con-
stant, a dissociation that could account for diVerences in
the phenomenal description of the two events.
2. General method
The stimuli (Fig. 1) were generated using True Basic 2.7 with an Apple
Power PC-G3/333 MHz I-Mac and presented on a monitor of 1024 £ 748
pixels resolution at 57 cm viewing distance. One pair of squares (S1 and
S2) with 0.5° side were aligned horizontally (except in one condition) and
presented on a white background, at 2.5° from the centre of the screen,
without Wxation mark. Squares and background luminance were 2 and 32
cd/m2, respectively. The spatio-temporal conWguration was such that the
Wrst square moved towards the second with constant speed on a straight
path for 2.8°; when the Wrst square contacted the second it stopped; the
second then moved oV to the right for 2.8° on a straight path, while the
Wrst remained still. This causal pair had a short interval between move-
ments (40 ms) and produced the Michotte phenomena of (a) launching or
(b) triggering, depending on V1. In a temporal two-interval forced-choice
paradigm the causal and the “probe” pair of squares were presented ran-
domly in the two intervals, symmetrically along the horizontal axis of the
screen. The interval between the two events was 700 ms.
By pressing one of two alternative keys, observers compared the speed
of S2 in the causal pair (V2causal) with that of S2 in the second pair
(V2probe), where the interval between S1 and S2 was 1040 ms, to indicate
which of the two was faster. V1probe was equal to V1causal.
Three experiments were carried out. In the Wrst experiment we mea-
sured how perceived V2 depended on V1 for diVerent levels of V1 in both
launching and triggering. In Experiment 2, we tested perceived V2 in
other causal conWgurations producing mechanical launching. In Experi-
ment 3, we aimed at assessing whether misperception of V2 was speciWc to
perception of causality.
V2probe varied, either lower or higher than V2causal (3°/s) at seven levels,
randomly in a block: 3 § 1.2, .8, .4, 0°/s. V1 was constant in a block. We
measured the probability of perceiving V2 in the causal conWguration
faster than V2 in the probe. Observers viewed the display binocularly and
were free to track. Using the method of constant stimuli, a block of trials
randomly presented consisted of 10 repetitions of each V2probe level. Psy-
chometric functions were Wtted to the probability of perceiving V2causal
faster than V2probe as a function of V2probe levels. The point of subjective
equality (PSE) indicated the overestimation of V2causal, i.e. the speed level
of V2probe that was perceived as fast as V2causal (probability equal to .5).
Moreover, to establish whether speed overestimation was related to the
strength of the causal phenomenon, we asked subjects to rate perceived
causality directly on a 1-to-5 scale, where 5 refers to the strongest impres-
sion of causality. In Experiment 1, we also asked subjects to discriminate
between passive and active motion of S2. Ten naïve subjects and the two
authors, all with normal or corrected-to-normal vision, participated.
Repeated-measures ANOVAs compared either PSEs or Ratings
obtained with diVerent levels of V1 separately for triggering and launching
(in Experiment 1) or with diVerent causal conWgurations (Experiments 2 and
3). Pairwise comparisons were made using t-test with Bonferroni correction.
3. Experiment 1
In Experiment 1 we asked whether perceived V2
depended on V1, that is whether diVerent causality events
were associated with diVerences in the perception of V2.
3.1. Method
In the test condition, observers compared V2causal (40 ms
interval) with V2probe (1040 ms) and PSEs were measured
for diVerent levels of V1 in both launching and triggering.
G. Parovel, C. Casco / Vision Research 46 (2006) 4134–4142 4137A control condition was also tested, in which a 1040 ms
interval was used in both pairs so that neither produced
perceptual causality. V1 was varied in independent blocks
(.5, 1, 2, 4, 8, 16°/s) so that we had three conditions with
V1 < V2 and three conditions with V1 > V2. Eight subjects
participated, six naives and the two authors.
At the end of the experiment subjects were asked to rate
causality to ensure that the conditions chosen were ideal for
the perception of launching and triggering. They were also
asked to observe twenty stimuli randomly presented, 10
with V1(8°/s) > V2 (3°/s) and ten with V1(1°/s) <V2 (3°/s)
and judge whether the motion of the second mobile
appeared active or passive.
3.2. Results and discussion
Discrimination of motion attribution produced 100%
passive response when V1 > V2 and 94% active response
when V1 < V2.
T-test revealed that mean perceived causality Ratings were
higher for launching (4.92§ .01) than for triggering (4.3§ .1)
and the diVerence was signiWcant (p<.005). Psychophysical
functions obtained in the three test conditions with V1>V2,
producing impression of launching, are shown in Fig. 2a.Data points are given by averaging PSEs of the eight subjects.
Psychometric functions in these test conditions are largely dis-
placed with respect to control, indicating a large overestima-
tion of V2 in the causal pair (mean PSED3.90°/s), whereas
there is no overestimation in the control condition (mean
PSED3.06°/s), indicating that when no causality is perceived
(mean ratingD1) no overestimation occurs. Most impor-
tantly, in these conditions, in which V1>V2 and launching is
perceived, overestimate of V2 increases in proportion to V1.
Fig. 3a indeed shows that the ratio between V2 and V1 in
the causal display is constant in the speed range 4–16°/s.
A one-way ANOVA with V1 as factor revealed that
there is no diVerence between the V2causal/V1 values
obtained in the three V1 conditions [F1,7 D 4.40, p > .05].
This suggests that V1 is considered the baseline stimulation,
relative to which changes in V2 are evaluated and that over-
estimation of V2 follows Weber’s law, an innate perceptual
rule. Under this law, the larger a baseline stimulation (S)
the larger the increment (S) required for a change to be
detectable: S/S D K.
The Wnding that, when V1 > V2 not only does causality
display cause overestimation of V2 but overestimate is pro-
portional to V1, suggests that observers do not perceive an
absolute V2 but instead V2 plus a discriminable incrementFig. 2. Psychometric functions are relative to diVerent levels of V1 for launching, 4 (light grey), 8 (dark grey), 16 (black)°/s, and triggering, .5 (light grey), 1
(dark grey), 2 (black)°/s. The psychometric function (dashed line) obtained when both conWgurations did not produce perceptual causality (probe vs probe)
is shown as control condition.Fig. 3. The values of Weber’s fraction, resulting from the ratio between V2causal and V1, as a function of the speed of the Wrst object (V1°/s), are shown for
both launching (a) and triggering conditions (b).
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perceived as a variation of V1.
Fig. 2b shows the psychometric functions obtained when
V1 < V2, a condition ideal for the triggering phenomenon.
Also here, the psychometric functions in the test condition
are displaced with respect to the control, indicating overes-
timation of V2 in the causal pair of the test (mean
PSE D 3.58°/s).
However, in these conditions, where S1 is perceived as
triggering the motion of S2, V2causal/V1 decreases as V1
increases. Regression lines Wtted to the average values show
an almost perfect linear Wt to the data (y D¡0.47 + 1.62x,
R2 D l0.99) (although, for two subjects out of eight, a loga-
rithmic function gave a better Wt). This indicates that V2
overestimate is constant across this speciWc V1 range (.5–2°/
s). This Wnding suggests that V2 overestimation is a conse-
quence of V1, but is independent on its value. This could
have, as phenomenal correlate, the perception of V2 as a
kinetic property of the second object, still caused by V1.
Since the relationship between V1 and V2 did not aVect
perceived causality as such but the way S2 motion was per-
ceived, either active (when V1 > V2) or passive (when
V1 < V2), we suggest that whereas perceived causality is
related to speed overestimation, the change in slope reXects
the attribution of diVerent sources of V2 motion: either
autonomous or belonging to V1.
The Wnding of speed overestimation in both launching
and triggering indicates that overestimation is a general
phenomenon and prompts the question of whether it is
connected to causal perception, or else to the spatio-tempo-
ral continuity inherent in various displays. To address the
point, in Experiments 2 and 3 we asked whether overesti-
mation was reduced by manipulations that weaken
perceived causality.
4. Experiment 2
The conditions used were those that aVect the impres-
sion of causation, as deWned by Michotte (1946/1963), and
were all characterized by a variation of the ways in which
the two objects interacted.
4.1. Method
Four stimulus conditions were tested. The relationship
between V1 (8°/s) and V2 (3°/s) was ideal to perceive
launching. The “launching” condition was as in Experi-
ment 1. In the “succession” condition, S2 appeared on the
screen only after S1 stopped. S1 moved 2.8° to the right and
then stopped; after the pause, S2 appeared contiguously to
the right of S1, and moved oV to the right for 2.8°, while S1
remained still. This stimulus produces the impression that
S2 came out from S1, as though it had been hidden behind
or within it. In the “overlap” condition, we produced a
diVerent manipulation that should weaken perceived
launching, maintaining the trajectory-to-trajectory align-
ment and varying the distance between the objects: S1 over-lapped S2 as it ended its trajectory. In this condition,
Michotte and, more recently, Scholl and Nakayama (2002)
would not expect launching (or it should be much weaker).
Indeed, this event produces the impression of a causal rela-
tion between the two moving objects — though without a
genuine impression of “collision” between the objects, as
always reported in a launching paradigm—or, in some
cases, a “tunnel eVect”. In the “gap” condition, there was a
gap between the Wnal position of the Wrst object and the
starting position of the second. The motion of S1 started 1°
further to the left compared with the other conditions, and
ended its trajectory after 2.8°, one degree away from S2. S2
then started to move right for 2.8°, S1 remaining still. This
condition is described in the literature as a “launching at a
distance” paradigm (Michotte, 1946/1963; Yela, 1952) and
produces the impression of a collision between the two
objects, even if they do not contact, as if the second object
were pushed by a force across an invisible medium.
Four naïve subjects participated, all but one (AP) new.
4.2. Results and discussion
The mean results are shown in Fig. 4. PSEs were equal
to 3.79, 3.32, 3.80 and 3.62 in “launching”, “succession”,
“overlap” and “gap” conditions, respectively. The
ANOVA revealed a weak overall eVect of stimulus
[F3,9 D 3.5, p < .06] and a signiWcant diVerence between
“succession” and “causal” conditions (p < .01). Ratings
were equal to 5 (launching), 3.3 (succession), 3.25 (over-
lap) and 4.25 (gap). The overall eVect of stimulus resulted
signiWcant [F3,9 D 4.48, p < .05], reXecting a signiWcant Rat-
ing diVerence between launching and succession (p < .05).
It is seen that in “succession” overestimation is reduced
together with perceived causality. This is the most power-
ful modiWcation that reduces perceived causality and
speed overestimation together. Clearly, the presence of S2
Fig. 4. The psychometric functions Wtted on the mean of individual proba-
bilities (AM, EG, AP, DB) of “V2causal faster than V2probe”, obtained for
each of seven values of V2probe(3 § 1.2, .8, .4, 0°/s), in the “succes-
sion”(dashed line), “overlap” (dotted line), “gap” (continuous line) and
“launching” (grey line) conditions. The temporal sequences of the stimuli
are represented in the inset.
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sality. The Rating results in the “overlap” condition are
low because of an ambiguous “tunnel eVect” in some tri-
als. In the “gap” condition, a causal relation is perceived
and overestimation is high even without spatial contact
between the two squares. This suggests that spatial conti-
guity between the two squares is not necessary for speed
integration mechanisms.
5. Experiment 3
Since the manipulations produced in Experiment 2 did
not fully abolish perceived causality, we are still unable to
determine whether the speed overestimation is speciWc to
the perception of causality, or it refers, in events not neces-
sarily causal, to the perception of speeds that are presented
in a temporally contiguous, non-delayed fashion. To distin-
guish between these two possibilities we tested a non-causal
event that nevertheless leaded, as the causal event, to an
integration of V1 and V2.
5.1. Method
Two conditions were tested. V1 was 8°/s and V2 was 3°/
s. In the “mirror motion” condition, S1 appeared on the
right of the monitor and moved 2.8° toward the centre; it
then stopped and S2 moved from the left 2.8° toward the
centre, and stopped to the left of S1. From Michotte’s
work, causality should not be perceived in this condition.
Indeed, observers describe these events as being indepen-
dent, with no causal relation. As a causal control of the
“mirror motion” condition we tested an “inverse launch-
ing” conWguration, in which the two motions were in
opposite directions but not aligned since S2 was placed
immediately below the stopping position of S1 [base-to-
base distance D 0.5°]. When S1 reached the upper side of
S2, it stopped and S2 moved oV to the left, while S1
remained still. Michotte and later Kanizsa (1991, pp. 187–
224) used similar conditions. The event was described as
expressing a causal relation between the two moving
objects, i.e., between S1 stopping and S2 starting. Some of
the participants had spontaneously qualiWed the move-
ment of S2 as bouncing in a direction opposite to S1, as in
a reXex action.
One new subject (DG) and three subjects used in Experi-
ment 2 participated.
5.2. Results and discussion
The ANOVA revealed an overall eVect of stimulus for
both PSEs [F2,6 D 53.9, p < .003] and Rating diVerences
[F(2,6) D 25.6, p < .01]. Post hoc showed “mirror motion”
diVered with respect to both “launching” and “inverse
launching” in the PSEs (3.17 vs 3.7 and 3.76) as well as in
the Ratings (1.5 vs 4.83 and 3.75). These results (Fig. 5) indi-
cate that in “inverse launching” causality and overestima-
tion were largely maintained when S2 moved in an oppositedirection on a non-aligned trajectory. It appears that cau-
sality is perceived when a change in the direction of a con-
tinuous trajectory occurs – even although the central
message of Michotte that the good continuity of the trajec-
tory is important. Instead, in the “mirror motion” condi-
tion, where both directions and spatial order were inverted,
causality and overestimation were almost abolished.
These diVerent results are obtained with two stimuli that
create very similar conditions of speed integration. Indeed,
the motion of S1 and S2 stimulate detectors tuned to the
same speed and direction in both “mirror motion” and
“inverse launching”. This suggests that overestimation is
only present when causality is perceived.
The Wnding that observers perceive overestimation and
causality in the “inverse launching” but not in the “mirror
motion” indicates that the crucial variable in perceiving
causality (and overestimation) is the continuity at contact
between the two motions.
Although the result of our experiments show that when
causality is not perceived speed is not overestimated, one
might still argue that speed overestimation might hold for
spatio-temporally continuous motion trajectories, regard-
less of causality. However, according to Kanizsa (1991),
temporally and spatially continuous motion trajectories are
always perceived as causal events and we have not been
able to Wnd a counterexample to this rule.
6. General discussion
Despite the extensive investigation of mechanical launch
and triggering both to uncover the psychophysical (see
Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000 for a review) and the neural bases
of the phenomenon (Blakemore et al., 2003; Fonlupt, 2003;
Schultz, Friston, O’Doherty, Wolpert, & Frith, 2005), our
demonstration that perceived causality is related to speed
overestimation is a novel Wnding. Our results suggest that
Fig. 5. The psychometric functions Wtted on the mean of individual proba-
bilities (AM, EG, DG, DB) of “V2causal faster than V2probe”, obtained for
each of seven values of V2probe (3 § 1.2, .8, .4, 0°/s), in the “inverse launch-
ing” (“squares” line), “mirror motion” (“triangles” line) and “launching”
(grey line) conditions.The temporal sequences of the stimuli are repre-
sented in the inset.
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motion vectors may aVect the qualitative impression of
causality, which is nonetheless perceived, whereas changes
that perceptually destroy the continuity between the two
motion signals hamper perceived causality and speed over-
estimation together. Our Wndings therefore could apply to a
broader range of causality phenomena than those resulting
from a strict interpretation of good continuity, analogously
to Michotte’s theory of “ampliation of motion”.1
On the bases of these results we speculate that mechani-
cal causality could have its roots in a speciWc kind of speed
interaction resulting in an overestimation of V2, constant in
triggering and proportional to V1 in launching. However, a
deWnitive conclusion cannot be reached, simply because it
seems impossible to distinguish sensitivity to changes in
causality from sensitivity to changes in spatio-temporal
variables that necessarily accompany the changes in causal-
ity. It simply seems not possible to avoid this confounding
by Wnding a condition in which, despite motions are spatio-
temporally continuous, causality is not perceived.
The core of our demonstration is that a simple psycho-
physical rule describes the speed overestimation eVect in cau-
sality. In launching, this overestimation of V2 is found to be
proportional to V1, thus reXecting the tendency of the visual
system to perceive the contrast of V1 as Wxed. Because of the
visual system application of the Wxed contrast rule, V2 is per-
ceived as non-autonomous and transmitted by S1, as per the
pre-Galilean theory of impetus (Bozzi, 1990; Hubbard &
Ruppel, 2002). This speed illusion in launching is comparable
to the famous “simultaneous contrast” illusion: a grey disk
will appear increasingly lighter, up to 30%, when its surround
is progressively darkened. Simultaneous contrast, as for the
illusory overestimation of V2 in launching, arises simply
from the visual system application of the Wxed contrast rule
as described by Weber’s law. In the case of perceived causal-
ity, Weber’s law holds when V1 >V2, since speed overestima-
tion is “caused” by the kinematics of S1 in proportion to its
speed. We found that in triggering, in which V1 is low, the
ratio rule fails since overestimation is constant and not
dependent on V1. We suggest that to account for overestima-
tion of V2 due to the presence of V1 but not directly depen-
dent on it, the visual system interprets the overestimation as a
violation of Newtonian laws of motion: S2 is perceived as
moving autonomously, with access to a “hidden energy
source” (Tremoulet & Feldman, 2000; see also, in a diVerent
context, Bingham, Schmidt, & Rosenblum, 1995). So, we sug-
gest that whereas speed overestimation results in perceived
causality, the diVerent dependence of overestimation on V1,
does not reXect diVerences in mechanisms, but instead it
aVects the perceived “attribution” of the source of V2 overes-
timation: the source is either in the Wrst object, when overesti-
mation is proportional to its speed, or it belongs to the
second object, when its speed is constantly overestimated,
1 Michotte stated that causal impression can be explained by his theory
of “ampliation of motion”, where the motion of the Wrst moving object is
transferred to the second after impact.regardless of V1. The demonstration of the dependency of
perceived speed on Weber’s law is highly signiWcant, given
that this latter has universal application in explaining our
sensations.
This speed integration mechanism seems to diVer from
that underlying perception of “biological motion”, which
instead is the result of summing motion information over
an extended temporal interval of up to 3 seconds (Neri,
Morrone, & Burr, 1998), because both perceived causality
and overestimation instead depend on speed interaction
occurring over a relatively short interval. The mechanism
responsible for perceived overestimation is also diVerent
from more complex motion mechanisms, such as that
underlying recovery of 3D structure from motion (Ullman,
1979), where the visual system has to assume that the object
is rigid. Speed overestimation in perceived causality is inde-
pendent of complex assumptions. Moreover, overestima-
tion is an eVect opposite to that predicted if the underlying
mechanism integrated local motion signals over a large
area of visual Weld. Indeed, a vector sum (Wilson et al.,
1992) would produce a change in the perceived direction of
motion but would not predict a change in V2 speed.
Motion averaging mechanisms, producing a global direc-
tion-independent motion estimate (Curran & Braddick,
2000; Khuu & Badcock, 2002; Watamaniuk & Duchon,
1992), would have caused an underestimation of V2 when
V1 < V2. Instead, we found overestimation across the entire
V1 range, suggesting that causality displays produce spe-
ciWc conditions of spatio-temporal interactions of local
motions. This interaction is diVerent from averaging of
speeds, which results with the perception of a mean speed,
probably because averaging is performed over spatially-
interspaced speeds, and generates a global speed percept.
Interestingly, averaging does not alter the capability of
segregating speed, whereas integration of successive and
continuous motion signals in causal displays results in over-
estimation. Moreover, a co-operativity mechanism predicts
that motion sensitivity depends on spatial factors. Other
global motion percepts, such as the prediction of motion
trajectories, are drastically hampered by manipulations of
the spatially extended trajectory between two objects
(Verghese & McKee, 2002). Instead we found, for example
in “inverse-launching”, the change in direction does not
matter much, as long as trajectories are continuous.
Some psychophysical results on motion co-operativity
seem related to ours. It has been shown that although dis-
crimination of speed changes of a single trajectory is hard
(Gottsdanker, 1956; MateeV et al., 2000; McKee & Nakayama,
1984; Snowden & Braddick, 1991), and Weber fraction is
several times higher than speed discrimination for spatially
and temporally separated stimuli, this is only true when the
two speed signals are part of a single trajectory, not when
they are distinct entities (Verghese & McKee, 2006). The
reason why in “succession” and “mirror motion” condi-
tions both perceived causality and speed overestimation
reduce or disappear has to be found in the hampered conti-
nuity of motion in these conWgurations.
G. Parovel, C. Casco / Vision Research 46 (2006) 4134–4142 4141It appears that when continuity of successive motions is
present, speed overestimation and perceived causality both
occur. Conversely, in the absence of continuity neither of
these two phenomena are present, suggesting that overesti-
mation is speciWcally associated with causality although is
not possible to demonstrate causation.
Another interesting issue is how the overestimation
relates to contextual eVects. It has been shown that cau-
sality can be perceived with multi-element displays
(White, 2005) and that ambiguous launch becomes unam-
biguous either when temporally synchronized to a canon-
ical launch event (Scholl & Nakayama, 2002), or when
perceptually grouped with an additional object (Choi &
Scholl, 2004). Our suggestion that overestimation reXects
a speed diVerentiation diYculty due to speed integration
is not incompatible with context eVects, since speed inte-
gration has been shown to occur with multi-element dis-
plays (Curran & Braddick, 2000; van Doorn &
Koenderink, 1984; Khuu & Badcock, 2002; Snowden &
Braddick, 1989; Watamaniuk & Duchon, 1992; Wilson
et al., 1992).
Finally, more complex interactions have been reported.
For example, Guski and Troje (2003) showed that causal-
ity judgments increased when additional auditory or
visual information marked the onset of the target motion.
This implies that a motion integration mechanism in
vision may interact with mechanisms in other modalities,
as some data suggest (Sekuler, Sekuler, & Lau, 1997).
In conclusion, our results fully support Michotte’s intui-
tion that simple spatio-temporal rules provide the founda-
tion of mechanical causality and triggering, and that the
key factors for causal attribution are simple but highly spe-
ciWc and stimulus-driven kinematic structures. It is interest-
ing to speculate whether other causal structures between
pairs of moving objects (chasing, reaction, avoidance) can
be contemplated in the framework of this speciWc speed
integration.
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